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Abstract 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) is an exciting new technology with applications in 
military, industry, and healthcare. These applications manage sensitive information in 
potentially hostile environments. Security is a necessity, but building a WSN protocol is 
difficult. Nodes are energy and memory constrained devices intended to last months. 
Attackers are physically able to compromise nodes and attack the network from within. 
The solution is Centralized Secure Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy 
(CSLEACH). CSLEACH provides security, energy efficiency, and memory efficiency. 
CSLEACH takes a centralized approach by leveraging the gateways resources to extend 
the life of a network as well as provide trust management. Using a custom event based 
simulator, I am able to show CSLEACH's trust protocol is more energy efficient and 
requires less memory per node than Trust-based LEACH (TLEACH). In terms of 
security, CSLEACH is able to protect against a wide range of attacks from spoofed 
messages to compromised node attacks and it provides confidentiality, authentication, 
integrity and freshness.  
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
 A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a collection of microcontroller devices 
designed to accumulate sensed data through wireless communication.  Equipped with 
transceiver, microcontroller, memory, and battery, sensor nodes collect various forms of 
data from a sensor module. Early research focused primarily on energy efficient 
solutions. Recently, security is becoming as important a topic. WSNs have potential in 
medical, industrial and military applications. These applications have urgent need to 
protect confidential data. However, developing a secure WSN protocol is not easy. 
Sensor nodes operate in remote and sometimes hazardous environments inaccessible to 
humans. Nodes must function without renewable energy sources for months. 
Additionally, nodes may number in the thousands so slight changes to the cost of an 
individual node can cause dramatic changes in the overall cost of the network. As a result 
memory is limited. The purpose of this research is to develop a protocol capable of 
satisfying the needs for security, yet remain energy and memory efficient. The scope of 
this project will include researching WSN protocols, developing a new protocol, and 
analyzing the new protocol in terms of network performance, memory requirements, 
energy consumption, and most importantly security. Analysis of encryption algorithms is 
outside the scope of the project. The new protocol introduced is called Centralized Secure 
Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (CSLEACH).  
 So what are sensor networks? Sensor networks are networks of sensor nodes or 
motes capable of performing automated monitoring or detection. Motes are devices 
equipped with special sensor modules such as an electrocardiogram (EKG), motion 
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sensor, or pressure sensor. Sensor nodes scattered throughout a region transmit data to a 
gateway (aka controller or base station). The gateway is responsible for organizing and 
transmitting data through the internet where the data is reaches a final destination for 
storage or processing. 
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Chapter 2 :  Background and Related Studies 
 
2.1 Security Attacks 
WSN face unique set of security challenges [30]. WSN not only need 
confidentiality, authentication and data integrity, but trust as well. Nodes deploy in 
hostile environments where attackers can physically tamper with nodes. Nodes must be 
produced cheaply to be cost-effective; therefore nodes are severely underpowered 
compared to laptop class attackers. Below is an overview of potential attacks. 
 
Hello Flood 
The hello flood attacks nodes using a powerful transmitter by advertising routes to 
the gateway. Nodes receiving the message see the attacker as a nearby node with a short 
route to the gateway, but the attacker is actually outside the transmission range of most 
nodes. Neighboring nodes become confused when data sent to the advertised route 
disappear. The hello flood also works with replayed messages [19].  
 
Spoofing/Message Altering 
Spoofed and altered messages are simple attacks that modify messages to confuse 
message recipients. Altered messages can spread false routing information to cause bad 
routing decisions. Bad routing in WSN translates to longer paths and wasted energy. This 
attack can be defeated by an integrity check such a Message Authentication Code 
(MAC). 
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Replay Attack 
A replay attack captures and retransmits a message. Replay attacks are unaffected 
by encryption. A nonce or timestamp is necessary to counter replayed messages. 
Timestamps are preferred by WSN because they require fewer messages. 
 
Sybil Attack 
The Sybil Attack is a class of attacks that target trust based protocols. The Sybil 
Attack relies on the ability to forge or mimic node identifications in order to produce a 
large set of identifications to leverage a trust based system. By sending false trust 
messages from a large set of nodes, the attacker can reduce the trust of innocent nodes. 
Sybil is preventable with a key registration system. 
 
Wormhole 
 A wormhole is a coordinated attack between two attackers capable of 
communicating through other means than the normal communication.  An example 
would be two computers at opposite ends of the network, communicating through a 
different frequency. The attackers share information only available to the other node. The 
attackers then advertise a better route than the ones available, causing neighboring nodes 
to use the attacker as an intermediary hop.  This attack sets-up other attacks such as 
selective forwarding. 
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Selective Forwarding 
Selective Forwarding works when an attacking node places itself in the routing 
path of another node. The attacker then chooses which packets to forward to the next hop 
and which packets to drop. The most basic selective forwarding attack is a sinkhole. A 
sinkhole drops all arriving packets. Often routing protocols detect sinkholes as broken 
links and attempt to avoid the link.  
 
Compromised Nodes 
It is hard to imagine someone physically breaking into a home computer to attack 
the network, but this is the reality for WSN [27]. Imagine a sensor node deployed on the 
battlefield to detect enemy movement. Attackers have physical access to the deployed 
nodes. Once a node is compromised, the attacker has access to privileged information, 
such as keys. How do we distinguish which nodes are compromised? This is where trust 
protocols come in. Trust protocols have long existed for Ad-Hoc networks [11][15] . 
Many trust based protocols use monitoring similar to watchdog [23]. The watchdog 
monitors neighboring nodes for “misbehaviors” which are reported and evaluated. A 
neighbors trust value entry is used to determine whether a neighbor is part of a trusted 
route. Trust is often established through direct monitoring or distribution of trust tables 
called Second Hand Trust (SHT). 
 Trust based protocols are not attacker proof, rather they are best effort attempts at 
intrusion detection.  Trust protocols often rely on special knowledge to determine 
“misbehaviors” which usually means knowing the definition for legal application data.  
Trust protocols are subject to myriad of problems, one of which is lying. Compromised 
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nodes can collude to victimize innocent nodes by passing false second hand trust values. 
Other problems include false positives and misdetections. Existing trust protocols for Ad-
Hoc networks rely on flooding to distribute trust. Flooding is unsuitable for WSN 
because of the energy wasted with redundant transmissions. In the next section, we will 
see and example of a WSN trust based protocol. 
 
2.2 Security Considerations in WSN  
Existing WSN security protocols use variations of symmetric key, MAC and pre-
distributed key schemes to provide confidentiality, data integrity and authentication [18]. 
The reason many protocols converge to similar solutions is because of the lack of 
alternatives. 
Public key cryptography provides authentication and confidentiality. 
Asynchronous feature in public key is useful for distributing keys and for broadcast 
authentication. The high energy and processing overhead eliminates public key 
cryptography as an option. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a new way to do public 
key. ECC reduces key sizes while still providing the same level of security [32]. 
Unfortunately, ECC is still too computationally expensive compared to symmetric key 
cryptography. As a result block ciphers dominate majority of WSN protocols with 
extensive research into energy performance of block ciphers [1][10][17]. 
 Traditional key exchange protocols use public keys. Most WSN protocols resort 
to some form of pre-distributed keys [7]. Pre-distribution schemes can be categorized as 
single key, pair-wise and random-key. In single key pre-distribution, all nodes in the 
network share a single key. If the single key is ever made public, the entire network is 
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compromised. In the basic pair-wise scheme, each node must store keys for n-1 
neighbors. This approach requires large amounts of memory to store keys. In random key 
pre distribution, nodes are assigned a random subset of keys from a key pool. Two nodes 
are allowed to communicate if they have matching keys. It only takes a small subset of 
keys to compromise the entire network. 
 
2.3 WSN Security Protocols 
 SPINS is a protocol developed to solve the particularly difficult WSN problem of 
broadcast authentication [28]. SPINS is built of two protocols called SNEP and μTesla. 
SNEP provides security between two nodes, while μTesla provides broadcast 
authentication using symmetric keys. SNEP uses block ciphers to encrypt messages in 
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode. μTesla provides broadcast authentication using a 
delay strategy. μTesla begins with the gateway generating a key chain by continuously 
applying a hash function and reversing the order of the keys. Each node entering into the 
network must be bootstrapped with a key in the keychain. The bootstrapped key is a 
commitment to the key chain because subsequent keys can be authenticated with repeated 
applications of the hash functions to return to the initial key value. The network is 
synchronized by intervals to which a new key is bound to. Packets send during an interval 
contain a MAC encrypted with the intervals key. After each interval, the gateway releases 
another key. A node can validate the key by applying the hash function to obtain the 
previous rounds key. 
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 μTesla does have its flaws. Because nodes must buffer data before keys are 
revealed, attackers can send random messages to overflow the nodes buffer. The 
receiving node is unable to determine which messages are from the gateway until the key 
is revealed. 
2.4 LEACH-based Protocols and Security Enhancements  
The basics of security are confidentiality, data integrity, and authentication, but in 
the world of WSN, energy is always the first priority. Early protocols prolong the 
operating lifetime of a network with clustering, multihop, and energy aware routing [6] 
[8]. These strategies focus on reducing transmission costs because transmission energy 
increases exponentially with distance. While these protocols are not designed for 
security, they do provide a useful energy efficient template to develop a new protocol. 
Numerous low energy protocols exist, but we will turn our attention to one specific 
protocol, LEACH. 
 
LEACH 
Low Energy Adaptive Cluster Hierarchy (LEACH) is amongst one of the earliest 
energy efficient protocols developed for WSN [13]. LEACH is organized into the three 
stages cluster set-up, schedule creation, and data transmission (aka steady state). Nodes 
form clusters under a cluster head (CH). A CH is responsible for coordinating 
transmission schedules and aggregating data. LEACH elects CHs by probabilistically self 
electing nodes. Candidates advertise their candidacy to neighboring nodes. Non-CH 
nodes select the closest CH based on the strongest signal strength. Non-CHs respond with 
a cluster join message to become cluster members (CM). CH is responsible for 
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organizing CMs by providing a time schedule. Once clusters are organized, each cluster 
can simultaneously collect sensor data from its members. This is possible with different 
code division multiple access (CDMA) codes. A CH aggregates the data before sending it 
to the gateway. Data aggregation saves energy by compressing data before transmission. 
 
LEACH Based Security Protocols 
 SC-LEACH is a LEACH based protocol designed to optimize LEACH by fixing 
the fundamental problems related to random CH election. SC-LEACH uses a pre-
distributed key ring that is used to coordinate secure communication between a CH and 
CM. SC-LEACH uses symmetric key cryptography along with a nonce to protect against 
replay attacks [16]. 
 Sec-LEACH uses random key pre-distribution scheme to coordinate clusters [26]. 
A key pool of randomly generated keys and ids are generated at the start of the network. 
Nodes are assigned a string of keys selected by a pseudo random number generator. Each 
node is also assigned a pair-wise key shared with the gateway. Nodes join clusters to 
which they share a common key. Armor LEACH is another security protocol based on 
Sec-LEACH [2].  
 
TLEACH 
TLEACH is a WSN trust protocol [31]. TLEACH contains two main components, 
the Monitoring Module and the Trust Evaluation Module. Each node also maintains a 
Neighbor Situational Trust Table (NSTT) filled with trust value entries for each pair of 
node ids and situational operations. Situational operations, such as data sensing and 
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routing, each have an individual trust value because nodes may not behave maliciously 
for all operations. The Monitoring Module is responsible for detecting a neighbor's 
“misbehaviors”. The Trust Evaluation Module evaluates which actions are safe to take 
based on NSTT trust values. Like LEACH, clusters are formed through self election. 
Instead of signal strength, TLEACH selects a CH based on the CH candidate with the 
highest trust value. TLEACH’s transmission period is separated into multiple turns with 
each turn ending in a trust update slot. During an assigned transmission timeslot, CMs 
transmit data to their CH. When a node is not transmitting, the node probabilistically 
determines if it will monitor a transmitting neighbor. Whenever a monitoring node 
detects misbehaviors, the Monitoring Module files a misbehavior report tallying the 
number of misbehaviors and good behaviors. The trust update slot allows the CH to share 
its trust values with its CMs in a SHT message. Nodes update their NSTT with the SHT 
and the misbehavior reports. 
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Chapter 3 : CSLEACH 
In this paper I introduce a LEACH based security protocol called Centralized 
Secure LEACH. The motivation behind this project is the need for security and resource 
efficiency in a WSN protocol. When building a WSN protocol, it is understood the 
gateway cannot be compromised because the network cannot function without a single 
point to collect data. Additionally, the gateway is unique because the gateway can be 
more resource abundant than a sensor node. These resources include a rechargeable 
battery, larger memory and greater processing power. To take advantage of these 
features, CSLEACH utilizes the gateway for key management, and trust management. 
CSLEACH builds on the LEACH algorithm by adding authentication, confidentiality, 
integrity, freshness and trust. Like LEACH, each sensor node is able to directly transmit 
to the gateway. Using a Key Distribution Center (KDC) approach, each node shares a 
unique private key with the gateway. CSLEACH uses single key pre-distribution to share 
a gateway private key that is used for broadcast authentication. 
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Figure 1 CSLEACH state diagram. 
 
CSLEACH is separated into the stages Round Start, Cluster Setup, Key 
Acquisition, Time Schedule Dissemination, Transmission Stage, and Trust Update. 
Below are detailed descriptions of each stage. 
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3.1 CSLEACH Details  
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Request Trust Check
Transmitting Data
Aggregate Data
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Cluster Head 
Advertisement
Transmission 
Schedule 
 
Figure 2 CSLEACH Message Transmissions 
 
CSLEACH is organized into periods called rounds. At the start of each round, 
session keys are distributed to prevent stale keys. Sensor nodes each possess two 
permanent keys, a Gateway Private Key (KCTRL) and a Node Private Key (KP). As nodes 
initially enter the network, they enter in a receiving state. Nodes wait patiently for a 
message from the gateway which indicates the beginning of a round. 
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Round Start 
 
Figure 3 Round Start Message Frame 
 
Each round is triggered by a Round Start Message from the gateway which 
functions as a synchronization message. The message distributes a Session Template (T) 
and an Network Key (KN) used to cheaply produce Session Keys and MAC Keys. The 
Session Key (KS) encrypts communications between nodes and the gateway, and 
communications between a cluster head (CH) and a cluster member (CM). The MAC 
Key (KMAC) is used to encode a MAC to provide integrity protection.  
 KS = HMAC (T, KP) 
 KMAC= KS   KN 
 
T is hashed with a HMAC using the key KP. As long as the KP is kept safe, a new session 
key can be generated each round. Similarly, a Gateway Session Key (KGS) can be 
produced by hashing T using KCTRL  All messages contain a timestamp to prevent replay 
attack. 
The Round Start Message is unique because the message must first be decrypted 
before the integrity of the message can be validated. This is because the KMAC for each 
round is unique, and a new KMAC depends on KN which is part of the Round Start 
Message. 
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Cluster Setup Stage 
 Once the network synchronizes using the Round Start Message, nodes enter the 
Cluster Setup Stage.    
 
Figure 4 Blacklist Message Frame 
 
The gateway first distributes a blacklist to warn nodes of malicious or faulty nodes. The 
blacklist is used to reject malicious nodes from becoming Cluster Heads (CH). The 
blacklist message contains a Maximum ID Value and a list of blacklisted nodes. Nodes 
entering into the network have sequential IDs. The Maximum ID Value is used by nodes 
to reject any ID with a greater value which allow nodes to reject invalid IDs. The black 
list message is encrypted with the KGS which prevents older blacklists from being 
replayed. It is important to note the advertisement message is encrypted with the KGS to 
prevent nodes outside of the network from spoofing as CHs. The blacklist exists to 
prevent compromised nodes from becoming a CH based the nodes reputation. The 
blacklist does not prevent a compromised node from spoofing another node. 
 Once nodes receive the blacklist, nodes self elect to become cluster head. Nodes 
elect by generating random numbers and following the same formula outlined in 
LEACH. Nodes elected as cluster head advertise their candidacy to neighboring nodes.  
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Figure 5 Cluster Head Advertisement Message Frame 
 
The advertisement message contains the CH’s preset Code Division Multiple Access 
(CDMA) code which enables clusters to communicate without interfering with 
neighboring clusters. The remaining nodes select a CH based on a CH candidates signal 
strength, and reject nodes listed by the blacklist. 
 
Figure 6 Cluster Join Message Frame 
 
 Nodes become CM by responding to a chosen cluster head with a join message.  
 
Key Acquisition 
 Before a CM can begin transmitting data to a CH, the CH must acquire KS for its 
members to ensure data confidentiality. To obtain each CM’s KS, the CH compiles a list 
of CM IDs in a Member Session Key Request Message.  
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Figure 7 Round Start Message Frame 
 
During this stage, the gateway can associate CMs with CHs. The associations allow the 
gateway to scan for duplicate IDs and to select CM for Trust Checks from each cluster. If 
a CM has insufficient trust, the gateway can withhold supplying a KS to prevent the CM 
from communicating with the CH.  
 
Figure 8 Member Session Key Response Message Frame 
 
Once the keys are compiled, a response message is sent containing a list of session ids, 
session keys, and a Trust Check Initialization Vector (TCIV). The TCIV will be used 
produce a MAC called the Trust Check (TC). The entire key response message is 
encrypted using the CHs private key.   
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Time Schedule Dissemination 
 
Figure 9 Time Schedule Message Frame 
 
 At this point in the protocol, a CH will have a list of session keys and TCIVs. The 
CH is responsible for coordinating the Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) section 
of the protocol. The CH is responsible for assigning timeslots for CM to transmit their 
sensor data to the CH. For every node the gateway does not provide a KS, the CH will not 
be able to transmit a time schedule to that node. Nodes that do not receive a time 
schedule will no longer participate in the protocol and must wait for the next round.  
Accepted members are assigned timeslots designating when a node can transmit.  
 
Transmission Stage 
 CSLEACH partitions transmission periods into turns, as seen in TLEACH. Each 
CM will transmit one timeslot each turn. After a turn is complete, the next turn begins 
until a preset number of turns are reached. Greater turns equates to smaller round setup 
overhead per transmission and conversely more memory required by the CH. In addition 
to transmitting the sensor data, it is the responsibility of the CM to maintain a MAC of all 
of its transmission for a given round. This MAC is called a Trust Check (TC). The MAC 
produced uses the TCIV given by the gateway. The TCIV must be unique each round 
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because a nodes private key is used to encode the TC. If nodes transmit predictable 
patterns of data, and the same TCIV is used each round, then the encrypted data could fall 
victim to known plaintext attacks.   
 
Figure 10 Data Transmission Message Frame 
 
 Once the transmissions are complete, the CH will aggregate data and send the 
data to the gateway. The data aggregation must be lossless to ensure the gateway is able 
to retrace the source node ID of sensor data. This is important for the gateway to produce 
a MAC to compare to the TC produced by a CM.  
 
Figure 11 Aggregate Data Message Frame 
 
 
Trust Update 
After a round, the gateway must evaluate the performance of each node. The 
gateway is able to reproduce a TC for each CM based on the data received by each CH. 
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To verify if the TC is correct, the gateway selects CMs to sample TCs. The trust selection 
probability determines how many CMs are selected by the gateway.  
 
# CM selected per cluster = trust selection probability/CH election probability 
 
Figure 12 Trust Check Request Message Frame 
 
The gateway sends a TC request message to randomly selected CMs. The gateway also 
computes a TC value from the aggregate data for the selected node. If the TC from the 
node mismatches the TC from the gateway, both the CH and the selected CM are 
punished.  
 
Figure 13 Trust Check Response Message Frame 
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Keys Owner Origins Users Purpose Usage 
Gateway  Gateway Randomly Gateway,  Prevent nodes not  To Encrypt the  
Private   Generated Registered registered with the  Round Start Message. 
Key     Nodes gateway from participating   
        in communications.   
Gateway  Gateway HMAC (T,  Gateway, Prevent nodes not  To Encrypt the  
Session    Gateway  Registered  registered with the Blacklist Message,  
Key   Private Key) Nodes gateway from participating Cluster Head  
        in communications and to  Advertisement 
        prevent overexposure of   Message, 
        the  Gateway Private Key Cluster Join Message. 
Node  Node Randomly Node,  Protects communications  To Encrypt  
Private    Generated Gateway between a node and the  Trust Check Response  
Key       gateway from the attacks  Message,  
        from a compromised Aggregate Data  
        Cluster Head. Message. 
Node  Node HMAC (T, Node,  Protects communications  To Encrypt  
Session    Node Private Gateway,  between a Cluster Head  Member Session Key  
Key   Key) Cluster Head,  and Cluster Members, Request Message,  
      Cluster- from unregistered nodes  Member Session Key  
      Member and compromised nodes. Response Message,  
          Time Schedule  
          Message,. 
          Trust Check Request  
          Message 
Mac Keys Node <Encryption  Node, Integrity protect  To Integrity check the  
    Key>  KN Gateway,  messages. Member Session Key 
      Cluster Head,    Request Message,  
      Cluster-    Member Session Key  
      Member   Response Message, 
          Time Schedule  
          Message,  
          Trust Check Request 
          Message. 
Note:  
Network Key (KN) and Session Template (T) are components of the Round Start Message. 
Node Keys are designated Cluster Head Keys and Member Keys dependant on the current role of 
the node. 
Table 1. CSLEACH key table. 
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Trust mechanism 
CSLEACH employs a trust mechanism specifically catered to the unique 
relationship between CHs and CMs. As an intruder, the role of CH is very salient because 
CHs are responsible for routing data from CMs. CSLEACH uses two thresholds termed 
Clusterhead Trust Threshold (CTT), and the Member Trust Threshold (MTT). Trust is 
scaled between 0 and 100 and nodes begin with a trust value of 100. Nodes with trust 
above the CTT are privileged to become a CH. Nodes with trust above the MTT are 
allowed to participate as CMs. Nodes with trust below CTT have likely experienced 
communication problems and are at risk of dropping packets. These nodes are blacklisted 
from becoming clusterhead. Nodes below the MTT are absolutely untrustworthy nodes 
that are blacklisted and rejected from any session key requests. For nodes that cross the 
MTT into the lowest trust region, their trust is automatically assigned zero trust. The CTT 
must be much greater than the MTT to ensure the CH is able to reliably forward sensor 
data. The CTT must be set strictly based on the noise level of the environment, whereas 
the MTT can be more freely set based on how strict the network should scrutinize 
suspicious transmission behaviors. 
 
Trust Punishment 
When TC validation fails, there are three possibilities. The first possibility is the 
CH is omitting or modifying data. The second possibility is the CM lied on the trust 
check. In the first two cases both the CH and the CM must both be punished because it is 
impossible to determine who the offender is. The reasoning behind the punishment 
scheme is the assumption that attackers are likely repeat offenders. A CH should be 
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punished more severely because of the low probability of becoming CH, and the greater 
potential for harm as a CH.  
The third possible case is a faulty transmission. Wireless communications are 
subject to interference causing bit errors. Any errors during the transmission period will 
cause a mismatch in the TC. There are a few things that should be done by a media 
access control protocol to remedy this problem. The protocol must provide a robust 
retransmission scheme. Acknowledgments can become security risks as Wagner points 
out [19].  CSLEACH helps faulty nodes by gradually recovering trust between rounds if a 
node is accidentally punished. Redemption protects faulty nodes from becoming exiled 
from the network for temporary interference.  
 CSLEACH’s trust protocol is configurable by adjusting the CTT value, MTT 
value, CM and CH punishment values, and recovery value. All values range from 0 to 
100. The recovery value should be much smaller than the CM and CH punishment 
otherwise trust punishments will have no effect. The default configurations are CH 
punishment of 15, a CM punishment of 10, and recover value of 1. The CTT is set to 60 
and MTT is set to 30. 
 
4.2 Protocol Comparison 
 LEACH [13] TLEACH [31] TLEACH 
(Simulated) 
CSLEACH  
Integrity None None MAC MAC 
Authentication None None Pre-distributed 
keys 
Pre-distributed 
keys 
Confidentiality None None Symmetric Key 
Encryption 
Symmetric Key 
Encryption 
Trust  None NSTT / 
Monitoring 
Neighbors 
NSTT / 
Monitoring 
Neighbors 
TC 
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Table 2. Protocol security comparison. 
 LEACH is not a security protocol, but it serves as a performance standard for both 
TLEACH and CSLEACH. LEACH has the least amount of overhead and memory 
requirements, but lacks in any security.  
 TLEACH is a purely trust based protocol intended to be coupled with other 
security protocols designed to provide integrity, authentication and confidentiality. 
TLEACH relies on message passing to distribute trust information amongst nodes which 
translates to transmission overhead. For the purpose of comparison, TLEACH is 
modified to adopt CSLEACH's key distribution mechanism which provides integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality and freshness. The modified protocol is used as a 
comparison against the efficiency of CSLEACH's trust protocol. 
 CSLEACH relies on the gateway as its TTP (trusted third party). CSLEACH 
communicates keys through encrypted messages between a CH and the gateway. Since 
LEACH is a two hop protocol, CSLEACH can use the gateway to detect errors and 
attacks against forwarded data. The gateway needs greater memory capacity to store and 
maintain trust table and key information. The gateway may cause scaling problems 
especially during blacklisting and key requests. 
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Chapter 4 : Performance Evaluation 
 
Simulations were performed on the protocols LEACH, TLEACH, and 
CSLEACH. A custom event base simulator was built to support memory, energy and 
performance analysis. For fair analysis and comparison, LEACH and CSLEACH were 
modified to adopt TLEACH’s multi-turn transmission stage. Additionally a similar key 
scheme used in CSLEACH is adapted to TLEACH. Initial transmission rate is set to 
20,000 b/s. Each round consists of 3 transmission turns, .6s transmission timeslot per 
node and 1024 bytes of data per packet transmitted. The cluster head percentage is set to 
5 percent with a maximum simulation time of 10 hours. Nodes are enclosed in a 100m by 
100m region. The battery is set to 100 Watt-hours or 3600 Joules. Encryption and 
decryption are both set to 3 micro joules per bit as data is encrypted using XTEA [35]. 
Transmission and reception is simulated based on the first order radio model as seen in 
the LEACH paper. Transmission and reception components consume 50 nJ per bit and 
100 pJ/bit/m2 of transmission amplification. TLEACH requires knowledge to determine 
what is considered legal data in the application layer. The simulation assumes the sensed 
data is legal if the data blocks form 32 bit blocks representing integer values less than 
100. Simulations output results in terms of good data, bad data, lost data and total data.  
 
4.1 Security Evaluation 
 
External Attack Analysis 
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 External attacks were graded based on the ability of the attack to introduce bad 
data into the network. Bad data is data from any attacker accepted by the gateway. If any 
bad data is received by the gateway, the attack has succeeded. The first attack simulates 
an attempt for the node to enter a cluster and transmit random data. LEACH failed as the 
bad data was received by the gateway without incident. Both CSLEACH and TLEACH 
prevented the attacking node from becoming a CH or CM because the bogus id provided 
by the attacker was outside the maximum blacklist range. If the attacker opted to become 
a CM, the gateway was unable to find a valid session key for the unknown id. The Sybil 
attack would also fail because messages are encrypted with keys registered with the 
gateway. An invalid key would prevent a CH from communicating with the attacking 
node, or the attacking node from communicating with the gateway to obtain CM keys. 
The failures of these attacks to join a cluster indicated subsequent attacks attempting 
similar feats would fail as well.  
 
Clock skew 
Next we turn our focus to replay attacks against the start message. Clock 
management and synchronization is a tricky issue. The clock skew should last no longer 
than the time it takes to perform 1 round. Even with a 1 round clock skew, it is possible 
to replay data transmissions between two turns during the transmission stage. The 
problem is exacerbated by the possibility some clusters may contain only one CM which 
reduces the time between turns.  
The replay attack simulated steals and resends a start round message periodically. 
Unsynchronized nodes searching for round start messages are forced to synchronize with 
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the attacker. By extending the time after rounds before the controller sends a start 
message, it is possible for the replayed start message to force all nodes into processing 
clusterhead setup before the gateway sends its round start message. The replayed 
message causes the network to become out of synch with the gateway. If the clock skew 
is reduced and managed properly, the likelihood of a successful attack diminishes.  
A point of interest is the how the network synchronizes. If the round start message 
is used to synchronize the messages, then what is used to validate the timestamp on the 
start message? This is a chicken and the egg problem where we choose to either protect 
the start message against a replay, or we use the time in the message to synchronize our 
clock. 
 
Compromised Node Attacks 
 Various attacks were simulated against TLEACH and CSLEACH to test the 
effectiveness of the trust mechanisms. Simulations were run with 50 total nodes with 10 
percent compromised.  
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Figure 14 Compromised node attacks and the effects on data transmission. 
 
Under normal conditions both TLEACH and CSLEACH receive high percentage good 
data.  
 
Random Data 
 Random data is sent by compromised nodes to the CH. Compromised nodes 
behave normally when assuming the role of CH. TLEACH peer monitors illegal data by 
reporting misbehaving nodes. CH assisted monitoring enables the CH to remove data sent 
from compromised nodes. Unlike TLEACH, CSLEACH is a pure media access control 
protocol unaware of application data rules. Roughly 10 percent of the network data is bad 
data which means CSLEACH failed to prevent any of the falsified application data from 
reaching the gateway.  
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Random Application Legal Data 
From the perspective of an intelligent attacker, the attacker could simply follow 
the application rules and introduce application legal random data. Application legal data 
is data that is indistinguishable from normal data when scanned by TLEACH's 
monitoring module. Both TLEACH and CSLEACH accepted bad data because neither 
could tell the difference between the bogus data and the actual sensor data. The overall 
amount of good data decreased as the network is burdened by the attacking nodes 
attempting to transmit 
 
Sinkhole 
For an attacker, the CH is a more attractive target than just sending bogus data as 
a CM. The following two attacks are variations of selective forwarding. In the sinkhole 
attack, attackers assume the role of CH every round. Compromised nodes drop all data 
received. TLEACH performs poorly against sinkhole attack because no monitoring is 
performed on CH transmissions. Conversely, CSLEACH is almost unaffected by 
attackers. Each time the sinkhole attack is performed, the CH fails a TC validation. Since 
the CMs outnumber the CH, the CH is punished more harshly causing the CH to quickly 
lose trust. 
 
Selective Forwarding: Odd Packets 
In the last attack, we attempt to forward odd packets received by the CH in an 
attempt to confuse the trust protocols. TLEACH losses less data because half of all data 
sent by CMs is received by the gateway. TLEACH is however unable to stop the constant 
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loss of data because of the lack of monitoring on the CH. CSLEACH performs almost as 
well against selectively forwarding odd packets as against a sinkhole. The TC selection 
process forces the CH to guess which nodes the gateway will select. If half of the packets 
are dropped, the gateway has a 50% chance to punish a CH for every CM selected. If two 
nodes are selected from each cluster, the CH has a 25% chance of escaping TC 
validation. 
 
4.2 Throughput Evaluation 
There are a few problems when comparing throughput for the LEACH based 
protocols. The goal is to obtain a throughput representing optimal conditions. In order to 
optimize throughput, the maximum allowed time for each stage must be minimized. The 
problem lies in the randomness of CH election. The random nature of CH election does 
not guarantee a constant number of CHs per round and therefore some rounds have fewer 
CHs resulting in more CMs per cluster. In order to prevent large clusters from surpassing 
stage limits, the maximum number of CMs is limited to twice the expected number of 
CMs per cluster. A portion of CM candidates are dropped from a cluster if the cluster 
reaches maximum capacity. Since each node can possibly reach twice the expected 
cluster size, extra time must be allocated to the transmission stages incase a cluster of 
maximum capacity exists. This means nodes are sleeping for long durations for smaller 
clusters. This explains the high variability in results between each of the three protocols.   
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Figure 15 Throughput versus number of nodes. 
 
Figure 3 shows the network throughput peeks around 2500 b/s. This is only a fraction of 
the 20,000 b/s throughput available for the network. Majority of the time is spent setting 
up clusters, key management, and other coordinating tasks. The network begins to peek at 
250 nodes where the network throughput begins to drop indicating the difficulty LEACH 
based protocols have when scaling.   
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Figure 16 Average node throughput versus number of nodes. 
 
Figure 4 shows despite the increase in network throughput, the number of CM per cluster 
increases at a much higher rate. As a result nodes are assigned shorter transmission times. 
LEACH, TLEACH, CSLEACH produced similar throughput because the election 
processes produces variable throughputs each round.  
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Network Throughput vs. Number of Nodes
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Figure 17 Network throughput vs. number of nodes under optimal conditions. 
 
Under optimal conditions, the CH election percentage elects the same number of CHs 
each round. With optimal conditions, the maximum duration for each stage can be more 
accurately bound. In figure 5, LEACH transmits over 100 b/s more than TLEACH and 
CSLEACH for networks sized 300 and more. The increased throughput is a significant 
portion of the 20,000 b/s maximum transmission rate. CSLEACH performs marginally 
better than TLEACH.  
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Figure 18 Average node throughput vs. number of nodes under optimal conditions. 
 
Similarly, CSLEACH has a higher average node throughput than TLEACH. The 
differences are so minute that variations in real performance may be unnoticed.  
 
4.3 Memory Evaluation 
WSN is a cheap solution to automated monitoring. Simulations record the 
maximum memory needed at a sensor node and gateway. The simulator conservatively 
approximates the number of bytes required by each protocol. ROM and memory for 
encryption are excluded. Note the same maximum cluster size is limited to twice the 
expected cluster size. 
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Sensor Node Memory(kB) vs. Node Count
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Figure 19 Minimum memory required on sensor node. 
 
 In figure 7, TLEACH requires roughly twice as much memory as LEACH and 
CSLEACH. The extra memory is used in the NSTT to store trust values. As the node 
sizes increase, memory required increases. The NSTT not only stores trust for 
neighboring nodes, but also nodes from second hand trust updates. CSLEACH requires 
slightly more memory than LEACH to store keys. 
 
 46 
Gateway Memory(kB) vs. Node Count
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Figure 20 Minimum memory required on gateway. 
 
Figure 8 shows CSLEACH with the highest required memory capacity on a gateway 
node. CSLEACH uses extra memory to store trust values for each node. TLEACH and 
MYLEACH both store keys at the clusterhead accounting for the extra memory over 
LEACH. The CSLEACH approach reduces the overall cost to WSN compared to 
TLEACH because only the gateway is required to store trust values whereas TLEACH 
reproduces trust tables for each node. From a cost perspective, CSLEACH is far cheaper 
to implement because of the lower memory requirements. 
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4.4 Energy Evaluation 
Surviving Nodes(50 Nodes) vs. Time(Hours)
Batteries Contain 0.05 Watt-hours(180 J) Energy
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55
Time(Hours)
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
S
u
rv
iv
in
g
 N
o
d
e
s
 
(5
0
 T
o
ta
l 
N
o
d
e
s
)
LEACH
TLEACH
CSLEACH
 
Figure 21 Number of Surviving nodes vs. time. 
 
Energy consumption is the most important gauge to determine if a protocol is 
suitable for WSN. Figure 9 is the result of simulating 50 nodes with 0.05 watt-hour or 
180 Joules of initial battery energy. Nodes experience energy drain during transmission, 
reception, encryption and decryption. Figure 9 shows the number of total dead nodes in 
the network with the passage of time. The two security protocols consume energy at a 
much higher rate than LEACH because of the added energy drain from encryption, 
decryption and frame overhead. CSLEACH and TLEACH implementations essentially 
use the same key distribution and encryption methods, therefore the difference in power 
efficiency is purely due to the trust management protocols. The simulation does not 
address the internal processing energy of each protocol so actual performance may vary. 
With that said, TLEACH is expected to expend more energy with the extra overhead 
 48 
from updating SHT. CSLEACH takes a different approach by spending more time 
performing internal processing to produce a TC.  
 
4.5 Error Tolerance Evaluation  
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Figure 22 Effects of increasing BER on CSLEACH. 
 
CSLEACH is not without its problems. Wireless communications is subject to bit errors 
caused by collisions and interference. Not all data is likely to reach a CH without 
alteration. If a robust retransmission scheme is in place, many distorted messages can be 
fixed, however there are many cases where this is not possible. The simulator uses 
negative acknowledgments (NACK) to retransmit data. There are risks to negative 
acknowledgements. If the source address in the frame header is lost, retransmission is 
impossible. Another possibility is losing data between stages. If a transmitting node sends 
a corrupted message during the end of the stage, there will not be enough time for a 
retransmission. The benefit of a NACK is the reduced volume of ACK transmissions. 
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Figure 10 shows the effects of increasing bit error rate (BER) has on the overall 
trust of the network. CH often lose trust quickly, but only until trust falls below the CTT. 
Once trust is below the CTT, the node is restricted to the role of a CM. CMs are far less 
likely to be punished, giving the node time to recover. For a high BER, the protocol 
protects nodes from falling below the MTT. For an attacker, it is nearly impossible to fall 
under the CTT with only attacking as the CH.  
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Figure 23 Trust distribution for BER 3E-6. 
 
The simulations uses the settings 60 for CTT and 30 for MTT. The CH punishment is set 
to 20 while the CM punishment is set to 15. Figure 11 represents a network with BER of 
3E-6. The network still functions because majority of the nodes have trust above the 
CTT. As errors increase, figure 11 shows the majority of nodes dip below the CTT. 
Nodes begin dropping because too few CHs are elected causing clusters to overfill.  
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Figure 24 Trust distribution for BER 4E-6. 
 
Under these conditions there are a few remedies. The trust punishment values for CH and 
CM can be reduced. Another approach is to adjust the CTT to 50 so majority of nodes 
qualify as CH. There is however another underlying issue which is the pool of possible 
CH is much smaller. The CH election percentage now only represents a fraction of the 
entire set of nodes. For future modifications, the election percentage should be based on 
an adjustable CH election percentage broadcast by the gateway with the round start 
message. 
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Chapter 5 : Moving Forward  
 CSLEACH accomplishes its goals to conserve energy and provide security, 
however there are many areas left for improvement. 
 
5.1 LEACH Enhancements 
The most difficult problem when optimizing the performance of a LEACH based 
protocol is dealing with the random election process. The random election process elects 
random numbers of CHs each round. Rounds with few CHs result in larger cluster sizes 
which means more time required each stage to disseminate timeslot schedules, and 
transmission timeslots. The maximum time allotted each stage must be buffered with 
enough time to account for larger clusters. As a result, time is wasted when cluster sizes 
are small. A deterministic election processes would reduce variability in CH election and 
allow for better optimization of maximum round durations [12]. It would also be 
beneficial to include the gateway in the CH election process so that the gateway could 
incorporate trust information to select CHs. Incorporating the gateway could eliminate 
the need for a blacklist stage in CSLEACH. 
LEACH creates a unique traffic pattern when forming clusters. At the beginning 
of each round, every Non-CH must select a CH. This creates a spike in traffic during the 
beginning of stages where bandwidth is shared amongst large groups of nodes.  This is 
especially noticeable during simulation because the simulator spends a majority of its 
time calculating collisions and backoffs. Random sleep durations were assigned before 
each round to improve the runtime of the simulator. In a real WSN, the increased volume 
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of collisions could cause increased corrupted packets at the start of a stage and 
implementing a random sleep strategy could be beneficial.  
 
5.2 Security Enhancements 
After Thoughts on Attacks 
One of the major flaws in CSLEACH is the lack of broadcast authentication once 
a node is compromised. A compromised node has all the information necessary to forge a 
start message. The gateway private key is the critical component preventing an external 
attacker from sending a forged round start message. Compromised attackers have access 
to all the necessary components to spoof a start message. A single compromised node can 
perform a DOS (Denial of Service) attack against CSLEACH by attacking the 
synchronization of the network. This weakness does point out the need for asynchronous 
broadcast authentication. Possibilities include using Lamport's and Merkle's one-time 
signatures [24]. 
To reach the true performance potentials of each algorithm, an efficient data 
aggregation or compression algorithm is necessary. Since CSLEACH requires a lossless 
aggregation schemes, the true gauge of how well LEACH, TLEACH, and CSLEACH 
may depend on the aggregation algorithms allowed. 
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Chapter 6 : Conclusion 
  
WSN of the future will be energy efficient and secure. Developing such a protocol 
is about tradeoffs. Often to fix a security risk, the protocol sacrifices its energy efficiency. 
To make sensor nodes cheaper, we sacrifice security. CSLEACH attempts to interlace 
security and energy efficient methodologies into a single protocol. CSLEACH is more 
energy efficient, requires less memory per node than TLEACH and adapts a strategy for 
evaluating trust independent of application data knowledge. CSLEACH relies on the 
gateways superior resources to manage key distribution and trust management. By 
increasing packet sizes, increasing transmission turns, and using energy efficient block 
ciphers, SCLEACH can reduce the overhead from encryption and key distribution. As a 
result of research, we have shown how difficult LEACH is to protect. While SCLEACH 
has much to improve upon, it is a small step towards a necessary goal.  
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